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FACIAL DISCRIMINATION: DARLENE JESPERSEN’S FIGHT AGAINST 
THE BARBIE-FICATION OF BARTENDERS 
JENNIFER C. PIZER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Darlene Jespersen’s struggle against Harrah’s Operating Co. is a “Davida 
and Goliath” story: Jespersen, a determined career bartender, stood up to a 
mega-corporation’s mandate that its female employees conform to a “uniform 
look”—a look that standardized women’s faces to an extreme extent, even for 
the contrived-glamour world of Nevada gaming. Harrah’s so-called “Personal 
Best” policy “facially” discriminated based on sex: The policy explicitly required 
female bartenders to “uniform” their faces, while permitting male bartenders to 
retain their autonomy about this most personal of attributes. By requiring 
female employees to alter their faces daily to conform to a stylized, company-
approved feminine “look,” Harrah’s policy deprived women like Darlene 
Jespersen of basic dignity, and imposed on them added burdens of cost and time 
that had no equivalent counterparts for male employees. 
Jespersen wore the Harrah’s uniform with pride for more than twenty 
years. A respectful, loyal employee, she tried in good faith to wear facial 
makeup as Harrah’s directed. But for this nearly six-foot tall, broad-shouldered 
woman with a down-to-earth persona, having to be “dolled up”1 and present an 
artifice of femininity was a humiliating, alienating exercise, and it interfered 
with her ability to interact effectively with customers, especially unruly ones. 
Jespersen believed she was entitled to enough respect as a hard-working, 
dignified employee that she should not have to submit to a demeaning, gender-
based contrivance when her male coworkers faced no analogous requirement. 
Given that the only reason she was instructed to endure a daily “makeover” was 
“because of [her] sex,”2 shouldn’t Title VII speak up on her behalf? 
This author had the privilege of representing Darlene Jespersen in her 
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit after the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Nevada entered summary judgment against her.3 In the 
Ninth Circuit, a divided three-judge panel affirmed the summary judgment 
 
 * Senior Counsel, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; J.D., New York University 
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 1. Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 25, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 
392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2003 WL 22716697. 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)(1) (2000). See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989) 
(plurality opinion) (discussing what it means for disparate treatment to be “because of sex”). 
 3. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 
1076 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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order.4 On rehearing en banc, a multiply divided court again affirmed the grant 
of summary judgment against Jespersen.5 Yet, even as it denied Jespersen her 
day in court, the en banc majority actually took a legal step forward for which 
Jespersen had advocated: The court acknowledged that sex-differentiated 
appearance codes may be challenged under Title VII if they incorporate sex 
stereotypes that burden workers unequally because of their sex. While it was 
deeply disappointing—and wrong—that the majority denied Jespersen her day 
in court to present her case using this framing of the test and to insist that 
Harrah’s try to justify the unusual burdens of its policy, she takes some measure 
of satisfaction at the progress that was made by this case, as does this author. 
We both are deeply grateful to the many people who contributed in invaluable 
ways to its achievement.6 
It has been an honor and a pleasure to participate in this symposium and 
print issue of the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy. To see the range of 
questions and perceptions inspired by this case has been a valuable and 
fascinating experience. It has been gratifying to see the case’s connections to 
scholarly work in diverse yet interrelated fields—fields in which academics and 
advocates together are addressing the increasingly complete sacrifice of 
workers’ personhood to competitive corporate “branding.” As standardization 
through “branding” becomes the ever-more-dominant business theme, there is a 
corresponding loss of dignity and growing alienation that should trouble us all. 
Lambda Legal took up Darlene Jespersen’s case because restrictive, gender-
based rules about personal appearance and deportment can pose particular 
burdens for anyone whose gender identity or expression varies from 
conventional stereotypes; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) 
people are disproportionately burdened by such rules.7 Many LGBT people 
 
 4. Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 
F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 5. Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 6. The amici curiae briefs both to the three-judge panel and to the en banc panel were excellent 
and, we believe, incredibly important. Our sincerest thanks for that work go to Martha Matthews, 
Romana Mancini, Janet Belcove-Shalin, Allen Lichtenstein, Kathleen Phair Barnard, Sara Ainsworth, 
Nancy Solomon, Vicky Barker, Andrew Dwyer, Hilary Meyer, David Cruz, Jeffrey Erdman, Paula 
Brantner, Shannon Minter, Courtney Joslin, Chris Daley, April Wilson-South, Michelle Williams 
Court, Marguerite Downing, Patricia Shiu, Elizabeth Kristen, and Claudia Center. This author also is 
indebted to the generous, thoughtful advocates who participated in the oral argument moots, to 
former legal intern Paria Kooklan, to Cole Thaler, a remarkable colleague dedicated to the fight for 
gender equality, and to superb friends who provided critical help along the way: Ruth Borenstein; 
Nancy Tompkins; Taylor Flynn; and Jill Anderson. Warm thanks go to former colleague Jennifer 
Middleton, who did terrifically good work on the first round of appellate briefs. Christine Littleton’s 
perspective, advice, and humor were invaluable throughout. This author is especially grateful to Jon 
Davidson, Lambda Legal’s extraordinary Legal Director and a treasured friend, whose insight 
helped to shape each positive aspect of the appellate work in this case. And the deepest appreciation 
is for Doreena Wong, whose love, friendship, and passion for social justice inspire for this author a 
vision of “personal best” worth striving a lifetime for. 
 7. Lambda Legal works nationally to achieve full recognition of the civil rights of lesbians, gay 
men, bisexuals, transgender people, and those with HIV through impact litigation, education, and 
public policy work. More information about Lambda Legal and its mission is available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/about/index.html. 
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cannot readily conform to conventional gender stereotypes. 8 For others, simply 
the process of “coming out” as LGBT or “queer” gives rise to a deep critique of 
the artificially restrictive gender stereotypes that pervade our modern lives and 
shape corporate marketing campaigns. For many who come to understand 
themselves as naturally outside conventional gender norms, the unnatural 
wardrobes and artificial physical shapes of Mattel’s Barbie and Ken dolls are not 
entirely benign. 
Of course, artificial constructions of gender are not only a queer issue. The 
demeaning sexism at the heart of Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy will matter to 
any woman who objects to having her natural face deemed unacceptable, 
especially when male faces are judged to be professional and desirable in their 
unaltered state. Today’s question of mandated gender conformity may concern 
facial makeup, but the question arises within a historical continuum of dress and 
decorum demands that have constrained generations of women.9 Yet, as 
Jespersen’s “facial” challenge to Harrah’s policy contended, there is nothing 
about women’s faces that requires being “made over” any more than women’s 
ribcages required whalebone corsets years ago, or women’s feet and legs require 
stiletto heels today. 
Periodically, American women have been blessed with determined 
visionaries who have put their bodies, jobs, and lives where many just put 
rhetoric. This Article is written to honor Darlene Jespersen, who is one of those 
rare and inspiring souls. Darlene is a hero without pretense. She resisted one of 
the wealthiest companies in America because she believes the law’s promise of 
equal treatment for working women should mean something, and that her 
twenty years of exemplary service to Harrah’s Casino likewise should have 
earned her a measure of loyalty in return. Darlene is not naïve. But she does care 
about fairness and being treated in a respectful manner. She also believes 
individuals can make a difference. To this author, Darlene embodies integrity 
and a centered sense of self like few others. It has been a privilege and pleasure 
to represent her, and even more so to call her friend. 
The Jespersen case has inspired extensive press and public interest. Yet, in a 
consistent and telling manner, pundits have mocked the case openly. Many have 
said or implied the issue is trivial. Even Judge Kozinski, who confirmed the 
case’s doctrinal soundness with his signature clarity and wit, said as much.10 
Others have insinuated that Jespersen must have been a slacker, a troublemaker, 
or an authority-flouting attention-seeker. Only a person itching for a fight, some 
say, would make a federal case out of makeup. 
Jespersen was no troublemaker. As Chief Justice Schroeder noted for the en 
banc majority, Darlene was an exemplary employee for Harrah’s during her 
 
 8. See Brief for the National Center for Lesbian Rights and the Transgender Law Center as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, 11–12, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 
F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (No. 03-15045), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-
data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/359.pdf. 
 9. See Brief of American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 7–11, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 
03-15045), 2003 WL 24133171. 
 10. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1118 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting) (expressing “dismay” at Harrah’s 
decision to terminate Jespersen “over what, in the end, is a trivial matter”). 
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twenty-year bartending tenure.11 Her supervisors and Harrah’s guests alike 
volunteered steady praise for her friendly, calm, effective manner behind the 
Sports Bar. Jespersen just could not stomach the humiliating choice posed by 
Harrah’s new “Personal Best” policy: transform her facial appearance according 
to the instructions of a consultant on a daily basis, or be deemed 
“unprofessional”, “unacceptable”, and “unfit” to tend the bar at Harrah’s Reno 
casino. Despite the extraordinary personal cost of putting her job on the line in 
what is essentially a company town, Jespersen felt she had no choice. She had 
tried in good faith to comply when facial makeovers were merely 
recommended.12 However, submitting to the artificial “dolling up” made her feel 
so exposed, demeaned, and alienated that she could not do her job effectively.13 
With her broad, imposing stature, Jespersen felt absurd attempting to mimic the 
“Barbie-doll” femininity of her more diminutive coworkers on the cocktail 
server staff. 
Notwithstanding her stature, presence, and effectiveness behind the bar, 
Harrah’s management decided that Jespersen could not just be another 
bartender among the mostly male Sports Bar crew. She had to be marked with 
face paint as a “lady” bartender. Henceforth, when women make their way in 
other male-dominated employment settings, can they analogously be 
spotlighted as different with pink hard hats and tool belts or pastel trench coats? 
This issue is trivial only if one believes that women should not expect and seek 
workplace dignity equal to their male coworkers. 
Jespersen was courageous to explain why the critics are wrong, and to 
spotlight the gratuitous insult of a rigid, heavy-handed policy that was despised 
by many Harrah’s employees—although no others would risk unemployment to 
challenge it. It is a disappointing statement about the state of Title VII law that 
Jespersen was denied even the right to insist that Harrah’s show a genuine 
business need for requiring her to be branded according to her sex. As the three 
different dissenting opinions make manifestly clear, there is no cogent way to 
reconcile Harrah’s treatment of Jespersen with Title VII’s command that 
employment opportunities shall not diminish “because of sex.” It is hard not to 
see the en banc majority opinion as a betrayal of the Supreme Court’s clarion 
proclamation of a quarter century ago that, “[i]n forbidding employers to 
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes.”14 Indeed, in its last en banc consideration of a sex-based 
appearance code, the Ninth Circuit itself reiterated this language with approval 
while striking down an appearance rule of a kind that was commonplace before 
 
 11. 444 F.3d at 1107; see also 392 F.3d at 1077 (acknowledging that Jespersen’s supervisors had 
described her as “highly effective” and consistently praiseworthy); id. at 1083 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]here is . . . no question that Jespersen’s performance was not only competent; it was 
spectacular. She was consistently given glowing recommendations by numerous customers and 
supervisors, despite the fact that she did not wear makeup.”). 
 12. 392 F.3d at 1077. 
 13. Id.; see also Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108. 
 14. Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978) (quoting 
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)); see also County of Wash. v. 
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (same). 
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Title VII was brought to bear against the entrenched sexism of the airline 
industry.15 
Moreover, en route to striking down Continental Airline’s differential 
weight requirements for female flight attendants, the Ninth Circuit articulated 
numerous, clear principles that one would have expected to guide the analysis 
in Jespersen’s case. As one key example, the Gerdom court explained that, 
“[b]ecause [the employer’s] facially discriminatory policy itself supplies the 
requisite elements of a prima facie case, we must look to [the employer’s] efforts 
to rebut it.”16 But in Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit, again en banc, held instead that 
the sex-differentiated policy did not suffice and that the plaintiff should have 
submitted multiple other types of evidence to quantify the greater burdens on 
women and to confirm that reasonable women in Jespersen’s position similarly 
would have objected, before the burden of production would shift to her former 
employer.17 The inconsistency is undeniable. 
What might account for the differences in approach? Do the authors of the 
two opinions have notably different judicial philosophies? Or was the Jespersen 
court bound by an intervening en banc decision? Neither of these explains it, as 
Chief Judge Mary Schroeder wrote the opinions in both Gerdom and Jespersen, 
and in both cases she wrote for the en banc court. 
By its own terms at least, the Jespersen decision also is not explained by any 
specific needs of the gaming business in which it arose; the court did not 
consider the needs a casino might assert because it held that Jespersen did not 
make out a prima facie case of sex-based disparate treatment and, therefore, the 
burden never shifted to Harrah’s to justify its appearance policy.18 
Based in part on questions posed during the arguments held before the 
three-judge panel and the en banc court, this Article concludes that the changed 
composition of the federal bench probably accounts for at least some part of the 
Jespersen result. In the years since Congress enacted Title VII, employment 
discrimination cases have come to make up a considerable portion of the federal 
courts’ dockets, to the distress of some over-burdened judges and many 
employers. At the same time, social attitudes about how women and men 
should present themselves continue to evolve. Education about gender diversity 
and the harms of narrow stereotypes—to which the Jespersen case continues to 
add—is helping to accelerate that evolution. This Article is written to add 
modestly to that process by sharing some of our strategic thinking, a few 
observations about the Jespersen decision, and two core themes for the future. 
 
 15. Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (quoting Gunther, 
452 U.S. at 180), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983). See also Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th 
Cir. 2000). 
 16. Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 608. 
 17. 444 F.3d at 1110–11, 1112–13. 
 18. Title VII’s ban on disparate treatment of employees because of sex contains an exception for 
circumstances in which the differences are “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [the] 
particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (alteration added). Such a distinction is 
deemed a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”). To constitute a BFOQ, the standard must 
concern “the ‘essence’ of the particular business.” Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 
U.S. 187, 206 (1991). 
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The result in this case makes a painfully simple point about the persistence 
of sex discrimination and the ambivalence of some judges about enforcing the 
federal employment discrimination statute as written. If Darlene Jespersen were 
male, she still would be working behind Harrah’s Sports Bar. “Because of [her] 
sex,” 19 her employment ended. To those of us who agree with Darlene that Title 
VII should mean what it says, Harrah’s at least should have been required to 
show a genuine business need for showing her the door. 
II. WHY THE JESPERSEN CASE HAS MATTERED FOR LGBT EQUALITY 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund engages in impact litigation on 
behalf of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgender people. Through 
carefully selected cases, we aim, among other things, to push society to 
recognize what guarantees of equality must require for LGBT individuals in a 
particular context. Notwithstanding the advances of modern equality 
jurisprudence with respect to many forms of invidious discrimination, it 
frequently remains the case that LGBT people are denied the legal rights and 
opportunities that others take for granted. This denial often is based on archaic 
notions of gender and sexuality rooted in Victorian-era concepts of women and 
men as “complementary” polar opposites.20 Sex discrimination doctrine says 
much that can be helpful for challenging legal barriers based on such notions; 
the challenge is to plan forward steps that will prompt decision-makers to 
recognize and accept these principles.21 
Impact litigation can be a powerful tool for social change. To understand 
fully the goals and contributions of particular cases, it helps to consider (1) why 
the cases were selected for litigation and (2) the social and legal context in which 
each was selected. Rarely are the cases we select isolated events. When they are 
studied after the fact, the range of potential goals sometimes is not recognized 
because the larger landscape collapses into one narrative—one morality tale. 
The fuller picture, by contrast, can reveal the aspiration to reduce a systemic 
problem over time, through education as well as legal reform. 
In the case of Lambda Legal’s representation of Darlene Jespersen, the 
context included the pre-existing goal of increasing legal and public 
 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 20. As one example of this problem, opponents of same-sex civil marriage sometimes contend 
that marriage must remain a different-sex-only institution because of the “essential 
complementarity” of women and men. They consider women and men to be incomplete as 
individuals and argue accordingly that each requires a mate of the “opposite” sex. See Brief for 
Women’s Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15–17, Andersen v. King 
County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (No. 75934-1), 2005 WL 901985 (discussing implications 
of testimony given by conservative religious leaders and others in support of state law excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage in order to maintain prescribed gender roles of women and men in 
marriage). 
 21. Compare Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding, inter alia, that gay 
student stated a claim against his school for sex discrimination in violation of federal Constitution 
based on school’s failure to protect him against peer abuse that school would have protected a 
female student against in the same position), and Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 
165 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (applying Title IX in a similar manner), with Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 
963 (Wash. 2006) (rejecting claim that state marriage law discriminates unconstitutionally based on 
sex against same-sex couples), and Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (same). 
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understanding of the similarities and distinctions between sex, gender identity, 
and sexual orientation. This goal included advancing the concept that 
discrimination on any of these grounds is inappropriate because none of them 
relates to one’s ability to perform at work or otherwise to contribute to society. 
Given the continuing lack of federal statutory protection against sexual 
orientation discrimination, advocates for LGBT civil rights have been mindful 
that the prohibitions of Title VII and Title IX against sex discrimination—
including discrimination based on gender nonconformity—can be invoked 
against at least some of the discrimination routinely visited on LGBT people. 
Harrah’s rigid judgment that all women bartenders must conform to a 
prescribed “look” exemplifies this kind of barrier to equal employment 
opportunities, which can ruin careers irrespective of an employee’s actual or 
perceived sexual orientation. 
In considering ways to use Title VII appropriately, advocates also have 
been conscious of the problem illustrated by DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & 
Telegraph Co.22 In DeSantis, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s sex 
discrimination in employment claim, concluding that the gravamen of the case 
was sexual orientation discrimination rather than sex discrimination, apparently 
based on information about the plaintiff’s earring and ostensibly effeminate 
manner.23 The court refused to take at face value the plaintiff’s sex-stereotyping 
claim—that allegedly he had been fired because his superiors considered him 
insufficiently masculine—evidently assuming from his jewelry and manner that 
Mr. DeSantis must have been gay and that his sexual orientation must have been 
the overriding factor in his dismissal from employment.24 Many civil rights 
litigators have taken a negative lesson in pleading from the disappointing result 
in DeSantis. 
The split of authority that developed concerning male-on-male sexual 
harassment created an analogous and similarly troubling problem for civil rights 
litigators. Many courts presented with complaints of such harassment seemed to 
become confused and irrecoverably distracted from the usual sexual harassment 
analysis under Title VII if either the alleged perpetrator or the alleged target of 
the harassment was identified as not heterosexual. As conflicting decisions 
proliferated, male plaintiffs often were permitted to maintain a Title VII claim 
for same-sex sexual harassment if they were heterosexual—or were perceived to 
be heterosexual—and their harasser was perceived to be gay. But if the target of 
the abuse was gay—or was perceived to be gay—then a claim based on the same 
conduct often was rejected as really a sexual orientation discrimination claim 
falling outside the bounds of Title VII, as in DeSantis.25 Eventually, Oncale v. 
 
 22. 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Given the current popularity of ostentatious earrings among professional male athletes, rap 
music performers, and other icons of successful men and ultra-masculinity, the DeSantis decision 
seems both dated and a telling example of how fashions shift with time and often do not relate to 
anatomy, how meaning is contextual, and how harshly individuals can be judged for failure to 
conform to what ultimately are arbitrary rules about what is appropriate and what is unacceptable. 
 25. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (comparing McWilliams v. 
Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996), with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 
99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
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Sundowner Offshore Services26 provided a partial resolution to the untenable 
division of authority, confirming that a gay person’s sexual orientation does not 
deprive him or her of statutory protections that others enjoy. It may be noted, 
however, that the plaintiff in the case was not identified as gay. 
Another strand of Title VII case law that LGBT civil rights advocates 
generally saw as warranting further development and reform was the line of 
authority rejecting sex discrimination claims brought by transgender employees 
who had been fired when it became known that they were transsexual. In these 
cases, the dismissal often occurred when the employees informed their 
employers that they were to undergo, or had undergone, sex reassignment and 
would be presenting henceforward as a different sex. During the 1970s and 
1980s, cases brought pursuant to Title VII on behalf of such employees were 
rejected consistently as outside the scope of what Congress had envisioned 
when including “sex” within the federal statute.27 But as no less a liberal than 
Justice Scalia observed in Oncale, it is the plain language of statutes that controls, 
and enactment conceptions should not thwart the text itself.28 In the years since 
Frances Ulane lost her fight to retain her job as an Eastern Airlines pilot, many 
who have reviewed the Ulane v. Eastern Airlines decision have concluded that it 
hardly could have been more obvious that she was fired “because of sex” 
because her sex was the only thing that had changed between when she was 
considered to be well-qualified as a male and then deemed unqualified for the 
same job upon transitioning to female.29 
Given the courts’ resolute rejection of claims like Ulane’s and DeSantis’s, 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins was a breakthrough in its recognition that the 
statute’s plain language should control over presumptions about congressional 
intent, and that adverse treatment based on failure to conform to stereotypes 
about gender-appropriate behavior and appearance can constitute 
impermissible discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.30 We can wonder 
whether the difference in outcomes of Price Waterhouse and DeSantis was due to 
the difference in the sexes of the plaintiffs. Perhaps it was easier for courts to 
recognize a new category of sex discrimination against women than against men 
because men usually are the dominant social group. Alternatively, maybe the 
difference simply was due to the passage of time and changed social perceptions 
about gender norms. Perhaps Ann Hopkins’ case was analytically simpler for 
the court because it contained no information suggesting she may have been 
 
 26. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75. 
 27. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. 
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 
659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1977). But see Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing 
reasoning of prior cases brought by transgender people and concluding that Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), has superseded them). 
 28. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75. 
 29. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085–86. 
 30. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (“In the context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts 
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the 
basis of gender.”). The Court emphasized, “we are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group.” Id. at 251. 
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anything other than heterosexual. Or maybe the difference in result was a 
function of sexist, if not misogynistic, attitudes that allow greater acceptance of 
women who adopt masculine traits than men who adopt feminine ones.31 
Unfortunately for Darlene Jespersen, Harrah’s did not share that attitude with 
respect to its bartenders. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s repeated affirmation that Title VII prohibits 
all disparate treatment of employees “because of sex,”32 the question remained 
after Price Waterhouse whether the decision should be read somewhat narrowly 
as a clarification that employees should not be put in an unfair “catch-22” in 
which they are penalized for displaying the very traits that lead to success on 
the job, or read more broadly as confirming that adverse treatment based on sex 
stereotypes can be actionable sex discrimination. Then, after Oncale, more courts 
began applying the principle that Title VII does not permit an employee to be 
persecuted by coworkers based on gender nonconformity in cases in which male 
employees had been harassed, usually sexually, by other men because they were 
perceived as not conforming to the harassers’ notions of proper masculine 
appearance and behavior, even when the male plaintiff had been identified as 
gay, or was suspected to be so.33 These cases marked our entry into the next 
chapter of this work, as the courts proved themselves newly able to distinguish 
between actionable sexual harassment and non-actionable sexual orientation 
discrimination.34 
There are multiple possible explanations for this shift. Surely widespread 
education and community organizing by the LGBT community played a part. In 
addition, it appears that cases addressing claims of sexual harassment and other 
forms of workplace abuse helped courts see the parallels to established 
harassment law and, after Oncale,35 to afford gay people the same protections 
under Title VII that are enjoyed by heterosexuals. 
Enforcing Title VII’s protections against coworker abuse is consistent with 
basic notions of what constitutes intolerable conditions in a workplace. Yet, 
 
 31. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 235–57 (May 1994) (discussing the tendency of Americans to 
impute homosexuality to men perceived as effeminate, and the violent reactions of some men to 
effeminate men and gay men, and their less-violent reactions to “mannish” women and lesbians). 
 32. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (citing Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978)). See also Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (citing Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)). 
 33. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Pregerson, J., 
concurring) (approving discrimination claim for coworker harassment based on failure to conform 
to gender stereotypes), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 922 (2003); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 
864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (harassment “based upon the perception that [the plaintiff] is effeminate” 
is discrimination because of sex); see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that abuse of transgender prisoner was actionable under the Gender Motivated Violence 
Act). 
 34. And more recently, the courts have begun to repudiate Ulane and Holloway in cases brought 
by employees who were fired because they were undergoing sex reassignment, holding that such 
adverse treatment can be actionable under Title VII as discrimination “because of sex.” See, e.g., 
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 
566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 35. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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these decisions led to the incongruous notion that Title VII might forbid 
enforcement of gender stereotypes by coworker harassment, but would permit 
employers to enforce those same stereotypes officially and more harshly with 
pink slips.36 The Jespersen panel majority’s acceptance that Price Waterhouse 
should bar coworker harassment, while refusing to apply the decision to 
prevent termination based on a sexist dress code,37 suggested a peculiar gulf in 
understanding. The panel seemed to recognize that it is wrong to subject an 
employee to obnoxious harassment based on the employee’s gender-variant 
deportment, but rejected the idea that it is similarly wrong to enforce gender 
conformity with rigidly stereotypical personal grooming rules. Perhaps this gulf 
arises from an assumption that abusive coworkers are not authorized to police 
their fellows’ appearance, whereas employers do have authority to set and to 
enforce appearance rules. But that difference in authority does not explain why 
the courts should express respect for an employee’s gender expression in the 
former cases and not in the latter. Perhaps the judges have assumed that 
employees who have been targeted for harassment must be unable to conform 
their appearance or behavior and would do so if they could because no one 
would remain the subject of such abuse if they could avoid it; by contrast, 
perhaps it seems that all employees can comply with dress code requirements if 
they wish, and that an employee who objects is simply uncooperative and 
undeserving of judicial concern. Whatever underlying assumptions there may 
be about employees’ ability to conform, the question remains why employers 
should be entitled to require gender conformity absent a showing of business 
necessity.38 Put another way, what gender-based appearance “standards” may 
an employer impose without violating Title VII? 
Given the burdens that gender stereotyping can impose on our 
constituents, LGBT civil rights advocates have placed a priority over the years 
on cases that illustrate the need for, and feasibility of, protecting gender-variant 
people from rigid appearance rules. A goal has been to show in more contexts 
that sex discrimination doctrine does set limits on institutions’ authority to police 
gender conformity and—what has proved to be the harder point—that courts 
should ascertain and enforce those limits because failure to do so inflicts 
substantial harm. Where a sex-based appearance policy creates a problem 
because it is especially onerous for a particular group—or because an individual 
has a particular, gender-based need not to comply—the challenge has been how 
to show that the dignitary harm inflicted is sufficient to create a cognizable 
discrimination claim,39 and that the institution has no legitimate grounds for 
insisting upon gender conformity to the extent required by the policy. 
 
 36. See Petition of Darlene Jespersen for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 9–12, Jespersen v. 
Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 03-15045), available at http://www.lambda 
legal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/362.pdf [hereinafter Rehearing Petition]. 
 37. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1083. 
 38. See supra note 18. 
 39. Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1982) (a sex-based differentiation 
is actionable if it creates a “significantly greater burden of compliance” on the complaining 
employee) (citing, inter alia, Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(holding that the requirement that male Safeway employees wear ties was “not overly 
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Youngblood v. School Board of Hillsborough County, Florida, illustrates the 
difficulty of trying to convey the seriousness of the dignitary harm inflicted by a 
rigid rule mandating conformity to a conventional gender stereotype.40 Nikki 
Youngblood was a high school senior who was excluded from her high school’s 
yearbook because she balked at wearing the black cloth drape that all female 
students were required to wear for their official school photograph.41 Boys, by 
contrast, were to wear a shirt, tie and sport jacket of their choice. Because 
Youngblood found the feminine drape humiliating and refused to wear it, she 
was excluded entirely from the yearbook. The district court rejected her 
invocation of Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n of Chicago,42 and 
held that the school was entitled to impose sex-specific appearance rules and 
that exclusion from the yearbook was not a serious enough injury to create an 
actionable sex discrimination claim.43 
Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., which was litigated contemporaneously with 
Youngblood, illustrated related challenges in the employment context.44 Peter 
Oiler was a married, heterosexual man who had driven a grocery truck for the 
Winn-Dixie company for twenty years.45 He was fired after he informed his 
supervisor that he periodically appeared in public during his non-work time 
dressed and groomed as a woman, going by the name “Donna,” which he did 
for reasons related to a gender identity disorder.46 The president of Winn-Dixie 
took the position that the company might lose business if any of its customers 
were to learn that one of its truck drivers cross-dresses during his leisure time.47 
As in Youngblood, the district court in Oiler read the protections against sex 
discrimination narrowly and in a manner that offers only limited protection to 
gender-variant people. The court did not require Winn-Dixie to substantiate its 
concern about potential loss of business and to explain how such a concern 
could be valid despite the cases rejecting “customer preference” as an excuse for 
otherwise prohibited discrimination.48 Instead, the court followed Ulane and 
 
burdensome”); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding there is no 
claim where the sex differences had “negligible effect” on plaintiff’s opportunities)). 
 40. Youngblood v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough County, Fla., No. 8:02-cv-1089-T-24MAP (M.D. Fla. 
Sept. 24, 2002) (dismissing complaint of plaintiff), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 02-15924-CC 
(11th Cir.). The case took place in an educational setting rather than employment, and thus involved 
a claim under Title IX rather than Title VII; however, the arguments were very similar to those made 
in employment cases. For additional information, see Press Release, National Center for Lesbian 
Rights, Discriminatory Policy Excludes Senior from Yearbook, June 19, 2002, 
http://www.nclrights.org/releases/students061902.htm; Legal Momentum, In The Courts: 
Youngblood, http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/inthecourts/2006/03/youngblood_v_ 
school_bd_of_hill.php (last visited Dec. 16, 2006). 
 41. See Press Release, National Center for Lesbian Rights, supra note 40; Legal Momentum, supra 
note 40. 
 42. 604 F.2d 1028 (1979). 
 43. Youngblood’s complaint also included a constitutional equal protection claim, which the 
court also rejected. See Press Release, National Center for Lesbian Rights, supra note 40. 
 44. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 89 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1832 (E.D. La. 2002). 
 45. Id. at *4. 
 46. Id. at *6–*10. 
 47. Id. at *10–*12. 
 48. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting BFOQ 
defense even where defendant claimed its business would be destroyed if it was required to defy its 
10__PIZER.DOC 2/8/2007 2:06 PM 
296 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:285 2007 
held that Peter Oiler was fired for impersonating a woman, which the court held 
is not covered by Title VII, rather than for engaging in conduct that the company 
deemed proper for women but improper for men based on sex stereotypes. 
Despite the evident challenges of these cases, LGBT civil rights advocates 
have retained it as a priority to develop ways to confront arbitrary, sex-based 
appearance rules to secure greater freedom and protection for individuals who 
have limited ability to conform, and also for those who can conform but should 
not be required to do so because sex—including one’s gender expression—
should be irrelevant in employment and education, absent a legitimate 
institutional necessity. And cases such as Youngblood and Oiler provided certain 
lessons. For example, they indicated that it would be wise in the future to 
prioritize cases in which the appearance policy at issue is more rigid and severe 
than policies imposed by comparable institutions, in which the harm to a 
complaining plaintiff is substantial and obvious, and in which the plaintiff is a 
person to whom many people are likely to relate. Darlene Jespersen’s case 
appeared without question to satisfy these threshold criteria. Harrah’s written 
policy was far more detailed, heavy-handed, and inflexible than those of other 
casinos. Jespersen had testified poignantly about why she found the makeup 
requirement humiliating and demeaning. She does not identify as transgender 
and could not be accused of trying to pass as a gender different from her own. In 
addition, Harrah’s never attempted to argue that their firing of her had anything 
to do with her sexual orientation. Moreover, because Jespersen had been a long-
time, model employee, her undisputedly excellent job performance would 
weigh heavily against any arguments Harrah’s might offer that makeup is a 
bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) for its female bartenders.49 Her 
case truly was a classic Price Waterhouse case, as both Judge Pregerson and Judge 
Thomas observed in their respective dissenting opinions.50 She was a woman 
working in a male-dominated field who was treated adversely for not 
conforming to her employer’s stereotypes of how women should present 
themselves, even though conformity with such expectations impaired her job 
performance in the way aptly described in Price Waterhouse as a catch-22.51 
Furthermore, given her expressed inability to comply with the makeup 
rule, Jespersen’s case presented a constellation of issues that appeared well 
timed to follow Nichols and Rene. Whether she had been required to wear 
stockings and high heels behind the bar rather than makeup, the core questions 
on summary judgment would have been the same: (1) what was the employee’s 
job; and (2) given that job description, could a reasonable jury find that the 
 
customers’ preference for male employees); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th 
Cir. 1971) (holding that assumed preferences of male business customers for attractive female 
stewardesses did not justify refusal to hire men as flight attendants); Olsen v. Marriott, 75 F. Supp. 
2d 1052, 1065 (D. Ariz. 1999) (same); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. TX 1981) 
(same; admonishing that “the BFOQ exception should not be permitted to ‘swallow the rule’”) 
(quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
 49. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 50. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(Pregerson, J., dissenting); see also Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 51. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
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appearance rule was not a BFOQ, and instead was imposed to cater illicitly to 
customer preferences or otherwise to discriminate improperly because of sex.52 
The straightforward opinions of the dissenting judges in this case confirmed that 
our analytical approach was sound and that summary judgment should not 
have been granted. Their opinions were in keeping with past, settled case law 
that Title VII should not be understood and enforced only when doing so is 
likely to provide fairness just to a minimum number of people, and when there 
is minimal objection by employers. 
Whether it is ironic or simply a measure of how we progress along multiple 
paths toward the goal of equality, in the years during which the Jespersen case 
was being litigated several legal changes have occurred: Ulane has been deemed 
superseded by Price Waterhouse and courts increasingly are recognizing that 
gender discrimination is a form of sex discrimination covered by Title VII, and 
that transgender people are entitled to that protection, including in connection 
with gender reassignment.53 As noted above, this conclusion is fitting not only 
because, in reassignment cases, changes to an employee’s sex and gender 
expression are what transform a successful employment relationship into an 
unsuccessful one, but also because the hostility toward transgender people can 
be so intense and the protection so needed.54 It remains a challenge to protect 
gender-variant individuals, and to secure more room for gender diversity, 
despite these recent good decisions.55 Yet, given the protective decisions, it may 
be easier now to protect an individual who transitions—conforming with one 
stereotype and then with another—than individuals like Peter Oiler who, like 
Ann Hopkins, asked to be judged as an individual, based on job performance, 
without reference to gender conformity. 
Since the population of transgender people—at least the number likely to 
transition from one sex to another—is not large, and the discrimination inflicted 
on them often is flagrant and cruel, providing protection can seem to address a 
severe problem without threatening wide-spread change. This, of course, is a 
critical advance for transgender people. But, individuals like Nikki Youngblood 
may pose harder questions for the courts. Though cases like hers draw directly 
from Price Waterhouse, if the plaintiff does not have a gender dysphoria 
diagnosis—or other means by which to narrow the impact of the court’s 
decision—some judges apparently just reject the notion that sex discrimination 
laws protect one’s right to express one’s gender in a manner that others 
 
 52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 53. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem 
(Ohio), 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 54. See Brief for National Center for Lesbian Rights and the Transgender Law Center, supra note 
8, at 3–7 (discussing pervasive, economically devastating employment discrimination against 
transgender people). 
 55. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1836 (D. Utah 2005) 
(granting summary judgment against transgender employee who was fired during sex 
reassignment; disagreeing with Barnes and Smith v. Salem about whether Price Waterhouse has 
changed the analysis of sex discrimination claims brought by transgender people; and agreeing with 
Ulane that Congress intended no such protection), appeal pending, No. 05-4193 (10th Cir.); Sturchio v. 
Ridge, 86 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P42,067 (E.D. Wash. 2005) (following bench trial, dismissing Title 
VII claims brought against Border Patrol by transgender employee after sex reassignment asserting 
gender-based hostile work environment and retaliation). 
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disapprove. Other judges seem perplexed about how to find an appropriate 
limiting principle.56 In the absence of an obvious “catch-22” to which they can 
relate, some appear likely to continue to favor employers’ authority to set 
employment terms and to insist on obedience. As Judge Posner put it colorfully 
in Schroeder v. Hamilton School District, 57 a case that rejected the discrimination 
claim of a gay public school teacher: 
The administration of the public schools of this country in the current climate of 
rancid identity politics, pervasive challenges to authority, and mounting 
litigiousness is an undertaking at once daunting and thankless. We judges 
should not make it even more daunting by injecting our own social and 
educational values . . . .58 
Being all too aware of the increasing prominence of such views among 
those selected for the federal bench, and given the losses in cases like Oiler and 
Youngblood, we were very conscious when considering Darlene Jespersen’s case 
of how difficult it can be to inspire judges to relate to individuals with non-
stereotypical gender expression and to take their dignitary concerns seriously. 
The losses underscored the need for both education and law reform, as well as 
the need to be extra careful in selecting cases to present these issues. 
III. THE THEORIES: TWO DISTINCT APPROACHES AND A PRINCIPLED LINE 
The Jespersen case was an attractive one in part because it was unusually 
clear and straightforward factually, as confirmed by the multiple dissenting 
opinions on appeal. This remains true notwithstanding the majority decisions at 
each stage holding that Jespersen’s undisputed evidence was insufficient to 
substantiate the discriminatory burdens on her, or even to make out a prima 
facie case of sex discrimination to shift the burden of production to Harrah’s. 
For twenty years, Jespersen had been a loyal, hardworking employee with 
an exemplary employment record. It is rare indeed in employment 
discrimination cases that an employer never suggests even once that the plaintiff 
was less than stellar in job performance. In Jespersen’s case, the positive annual 
reviews by her supervisors and copious unsolicited “guest comments” over the 
years showed that Harrah’s Sports Bar patrons were more than pleased to buy 
their drinks from her and to enjoy the warm, friendly atmosphere she inspired 
at the bar, despite her lack of makeup.59 As Jespersen became an experienced 
bartender, she learned how important it can be to command the respect of 
customers, especially those inclined to drink too much and to become unruly. 
For her, interacting well with her guests required her to have self-confidence 
from being comfortable in her own skin. When she submitted to a full facial 
makeover at the company’s urging sometime in the mid-1980s, when Harrah’s 
merely recommended that its female employees wear makeup, she felt it made 
her look ridiculous and transformed her into an object of male scrutiny in a 
humiliating manner. In addition to making her feel uncomfortable, the makeup 
 
 56. See infra pp. 306–07 (discussing questions raised during Jespersen oral arguments). 
 57. 282 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. at 959. 
 59. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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interfered with Jespersen’s ability to interact well with her customers because it 
placed her in a different social role; male guests and bartenders alike saw her 
differently, and she saw herself differently, too. After a couple of weeks of 
making a good faith attempt to become accustomed to the makeup, Jespersen 
gave up and tossed the remaining products into the trash, vowing not to endure 
it any longer.60 
The makeup requirement Harrah’s imposed in 2000 via the “Personal Best” 
policy was significantly more detailed, rigid, and intrusive than its prior 
recommendation.61 In addition to requiring full facial makeup at all times, the 
 
 60. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Petition of 
Darlene Jespersen for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 36, Ex. 3, at 121–22, available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/365.pdf. Jespersen is not alone in 
her perception that full facial makeup can change a woman’s appearance in ways that alter others’ 
perceptions of her, and can be seen as shifting her social role from that of competent actor, to one of 
passive object. Feminist activist Dana Densmore succinctly captured Jespersen’s experience with her 
rhetorical question: “How can anyone take a manikin seriously?” DANA DENSMORE, ON THE 
TEMPTATION TO BE A BEAUTIFUL OBJECT (1968), as quoted in, KATHY PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR: THE MAKING 
OF AMERICA’S BEAUTY CULTURE 261 (1998). See generally NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: HOW 
IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN (2d ed. 2002). 
 61. The “Personal Best” policy stated, in relevant part: 
All Beverage Service Personnel, in addition to being friendly, polite, courteous and 
responsive to our customer’s needs, must possess the ability to physically perform the 
essential factors of the job as set forth in the standard job descriptions. They must be well 
groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned, and be comfortable with 
maintaining this look while wearing the specified uniform. Additional factors to be 
considered include, but are not limited to, hair styles, overall body contour, and degree of 
comfort the employee projects while wearing the uniform. 
* * * 
Beverage Bartenders and Barbacks will adhere to these additional guidelines: 
• Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/ female): 
o Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time of hire. 
o Jewelry, if issued, must be worn. Otherwise, tasteful and simple jewelry is 
permitted; no large chokers, chains or bracelets. 
o No faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted. 
• Males: 
o Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited. 
o Hands and fingernails must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times. 
No colored polish is permitted. 
o Eye and facial makeup is not permitted. 
o Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) 
soles. 
• Females: 
o Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be 
worn down at all times, no exceptions. 
o Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee’s skin 
tone. No runs. 
o Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or 
length. 
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policy required employees to recreate the “look” chosen for them by a 
consultant and provided that supervisors were to monitor female employees 
daily, using photographs taken after the consultants had performed each 
woman’s “makeover.”62 The policy thus robbed female employees of any 
discretion about their facial appearance. By contrast, it left men doing the same 
jobs free to design their own “look.” For example, men could be clean-shaven or 
wear sideburns, moustache, or beard (in any combination), and could change 
their appearance however they wished and as often as they wished, as long as 
they went without long hair, facial makeup, and colored fingernail polish.63 
Given the sex-based lack of discretion, the greater uniformity of appearance 
demanded of women, and the demeaning message that women cannot look 
professional and appealing unless “improved” in a company-dictated way, the 
parallel to Carroll v. Talman Savings64 seemed unmistakable. The Ninth Circuit 
had cited Carroll with approval in its en banc decision in Gerdom v. Continental 
Airlines,65 which two decades earlier had laid out the analysis for appearance 
code cases within the Ninth Circuit, noting in particular that the plaintiff’s 
burden to make out a prima facie showing of disparate treatment because of sex 
is “not onerous” when an employer’s policy explicitly imposes different 
requirements for male and female employees.66 Gerdom stated expressly that a 
plaintiff carries her burden, and shifts the burden to the employer to show a 
legitimate business need for the sex-based rules, when the plaintiff shows that 
 
o Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) 
soles. 
o Make up (face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in 
complimentary [sic] colors. Lip color must be worn at all times. (emphasis 
added). 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added by court). 
See also Rehearing Petition, supra note 36, Ex. 2, at 83–84, available at http://www.lambdalegal. 
org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/364.pdf (appearance and grooming rules; beverage server, 
bartender, and barback position descriptions and appearance rules) [hereinafter Rehearing Petition 
Ex. 2]. 
 62. Rehearing Petition Ex. 2, supra note 61, at 80. The policy provided for mandatory training by 
the company’s retained image consultants and required daily monitoring by reference to the 
employee’s “post-makeover” photograph: 
When properly made-up and dressed in their fitted uniform, two “Personal Best” photos 
(one portrait and one full body) are to be taken capturing each employee looking his or 
her Personal Best. These photos are to be placed in the employee’s file and become the 
Personal Best appearance standard to which that employee will be held. . . . It is imperative 
that the department supervisors utilize these photos as an “appearance measurement” tool, and, on 
a daily basis, hold each employee accountable to look his or her Personal Best. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 63. To impose more comparable burdens on male and female employees, the policy would have 
had to require something similarly transformative and burdensome for men, such as requiring men 
to wear a full beard with prescribed contours. This requirement would alter each man’s appearance 
by concealing his face, cause the men to resemble each other to a far greater extent, and require daily 
maintenance and supervisors’ inspections. 
 64. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 65. 692 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 66. Id. at 608. 
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the employer’s policy contains different appearance requirements for female 
and male employees.67 
In response to Jespersen’s showing, all that Harrah’s submitted to justify its 
makeup rule was the cursory declaration of an “image consultant,” who opined 
that makeup “completes the uniformed” look for female employees, and that 
women’s faces benefit from makeup due to the purported rigors of casino 
lighting.68 The consultant offered no explanation for why or how the casino’s 
lighting might fall differently on the faces of Harrah’s male bartenders.69 
The district court evaluated Jespersen’s sex discrimination claim using the 
“equal burdens” test.70 The court rejected Jespersen’s claim by relying, in part, 
on a concept employed in early appearance code cases—that Title VII only 
protects employees against discrimination based on immutable traits. In doing 
so, the court did not acknowledge that the early cases limiting protection based 
on immutability have long been superseded by decisions such as Carroll, 
Gerdom, Frank, and others.71 The district court then engaged in a blatantly 
speculative balancing of the various different burdens Harrah’s imposed on its 
female and male employees with its sex-differentiated grooming requirements.72 
Despite the obvious incongruities of the burdens in the comparison, and the 
court’s recognition that individual employees of either sex may differ in their 
experiences of burden (for example, some men may want to wear makeup, 
while most do not object to that prohibition), the court then concluded there 
were no material factual issues requiring further discovery or trial, and that 
Jespersen had failed to show unequal treatment because of sex in violation of 
Title VII.73 
The following sections address three major strategy issues we considered 
when deciding to undertake and then preparing the appeal, and some key areas 
of concern highlighted by the judges’ questions at oral argument. 
A. Offering Multiple Rationales for an Appellate Reversal 
In preparing the appeal, we anticipated that the time was right to urge the 
court to reconsider the “equal burdens” test in light of Price Waterhouse, and to 
recognize that requiring male and female employees to conform to rigid sex-
based stereotypes is inconsistent with Title VII’s rule that each employee is to be 
judged as an individual, without differential treatment based on sex.74 This is the 
key underlying principle in decisions rejecting the notion that the “equal 
 
 67. Id. (“Because Continental’s facially discriminatory policy itself supplies the requisite 
elements of a prima facie case, we must look to Continental’s efforts to rebut it”). 
 68. Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 31–33. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002). 
 71. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 72. Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 8–9, 29. 
 73. 392 F.2d at 1083. 
 74. See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978). 
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opportunity harasser” does not discriminate,75 a principle that many people 
intuitively grasp as correct. 
Thinking pragmatically, however, it seemed wise to offer the appeals court 
multiple analytical routes. Notwithstanding our hope of advancing the law, the 
top priority always remained winning the reversal and reinstatement of 
Jespersen’s case in the district court. Anticipating that the appellate court might 
not be prepared substantially to revise the decades-old “equal burdens” test 
based on Price Waterhouse, we therefore also argued the case under the old rule, 
explaining why a reasonable jury easily could conclude from the evidence 
submitted—including very prominently the plain language of the policy itself—
that the policy was more burdensome for women and its overall message was 
subordinating to women.76 
Thus, we drew directly from Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan 
Association77 as we explained that Harrah’s policy unavoidably conveys a 
message that women’s faces—and not men’s faces—are inadequate in their 
natural state, and that women—and not men—are incapable of making 
appropriate decisions about how to prepare their faces in the morning. In 
addition to the discriminatory messages inherent in the makeup rule, Jespersen 
testified about the policy’s harmful impact on her personally, including the 
humiliation, alienation, and interference with work that she experienced. Hence, 
even if the casino had been well intentioned in fashioning such a rule, benign 
intent would not save it.78 
Recall that, on summary judgment, all reasonable inferences must be 
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party and the motion may not be granted if a 
reasonable jury could find in the nonmoving party’s favor.79 Despite the en banc 
majority’s surprising, contrary view, reasonable jurors should need neither an 
expert witness nor a pile of receipts to know, in Judge Kozinski’s words, that 
cosmetics “don’t grow on trees.”80 Likewise, the point that it takes more time to 
perform a “makeover”—especially to do so properly—than to not perform it 
could hardly be more obvious. 
 
 75. See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463–64 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting 
defense that harassment directed at woman was “cured” by fact that harasser also referred to men as 
“assholes”); Pavon v. Swift Transp. Co., 192 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To suggest, as Potomac 
does, that it might escape liability because it equally harassed whites and blacks would give new 
meaning to equal opportunity. Potomac’s status as a purported ‘equal opportunity harasser’ 
provides no escape hatch for liability.”). 
 76. Judge Thomas agreed, dissenting from the panel majority decision, Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1085–87 (9th Cir. 2004), as did Judges Kozinski, Graber, and William 
Fletcher, dissenting from the en banc majority decision, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 
1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 77. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cited with approval in Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 
602, 606 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 78. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515, 536 (1996) (holding invalid the males-only admissions policy of the Virginia Military 
Institute); Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991); Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982). 
 79. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). 
 80. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117. 
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Yet, the more we considered the “equal burdens” test, the more the exercise 
of comparing very different “burdens” seemed illogical and incoherent. Is it not 
a bizarre, apples-to-oranges comparison to weigh the burden of periodic 
haircuts against that of daily facial makeovers? In addition, as Jespersen’s 
testimony illustrated, not every woman experiences the same burden if required 
to wear full facial makeup; likewise, men do not all feel the same way about 
haircuts. How can such an analysis fail to violate Title VII’s command that 
employees must be treated equally as individuals, and not be treated differently 
“because of sex”? 
More importantly, it seems inconsistent with Price Waterhouse and the 
harassment cases to say that a sex-based burden on one person can be offset by a 
different sex-based burden on someone else. Such an analysis would be 
laughable if offered to justify that approach to other group-based, 
discriminatory conditions of employment. Consider, for example, a company 
that required its female employees to work in rooms without heat, but answered 
their sex discrimination complaint by pointing to the unsanitary conditions it 
inflicted on its male employees. Even in the context of grooming and fashion, 
with their admittedly irrational elements, why would two discriminatory 
wrongs make a legal right? 
B. Drawing a Principled Line from the Case Law 
We anticipated the court might have at least two principle concerns in 
deciding this case. First, the judges might view Jespersen’s claim as requesting, 
or inevitably leading to, a rule that generally would preclude any differentiation 
by sex in dress codes, something many judges would consider socially 
unacceptable and beyond with Congress could have intended.81 The second 
concern, a prominent variant of the first, would be a fear that any decision in 
Jespersen’s favor, if not clearly limited, would invite the ostensibly commerce-
threatening specter of men in dresses82—a result that would invite ridicule of the 
court. Since few employers actually have rules explicitly forbidding men to wear 
feminine attire to work—and yet, due to social enforcement of gender 
expectations, such sights are rare indeed outside certain nightclubs—it is strange 
how much preoccupation there is with whether employers might lose the ability 
to impose such a rule. 
But the concern persists that allowing women greater freedom inevitably 
will loosen the ties on men—literally. And the concern finds some support in the 
spate of cases brought by men mostly during the 1970s to challenge rules 
requiring that they keep their hair short, their cheeks shaved, and their ties 
 
 81. Despite the evidently common view that such a position is reasonable, Title VII has no 
exemption for appearance rules. And given the text of Title VII, why should employers generally be 
able to mandate gender conformity as a term of employment absent a specific need? Yet the Jespersen 
case required no such general principle. Thus, in light of the strength of social conventions regarding 
dress and grooming, an important goal was to take on only as much as necessary for the case. It 
therefore was critical to offer a workable and doctrinally sound limiting principle. 
 82. See generally Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 89 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1832 (E.D. La. 
2002). 
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knotted.83 These cases played a significant role in shaping the “equal burdens” 
test. Recognizing that courts were not receptive to those claims in large part 
because they did not see the male employees as harmed in a meaningful way, 
we drew directly from the statute and prior dress code cases in proposing the 
limiting principle that a Title VII claim only is cognizable when a gender-specific 
appearance rule tends to subordinate or limit professional opportunities to a 
meaningful extent.84 In most circumstances, rules about men’s hair length and 
neckties do not correlate to class-based subordination by gender,85 though the 
problematic implications for transgender employees remain important.86 
Case law explaining that an unequal job term or condition fails to give rise 
to a Title VII cause of action unless it has substantial effect—which logically 
should apply to differences in appearance requirements—offers another limiting 
principle. In dictum in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,87 for example, 
the Ninth Circuit commented that the decision’s protection of gender-variant 
employees from coworker harassment should not be taken as prohibiting 
“reasonable” appearance codes. This left open the question of how the 
“reasonableness” of particular dress codes might be ascertained in future cases, 
including whether there must be an “objective” assessment to confirm the 
reasonableness of the offense an employee might claim, as per the test in 
harassment cases. The question is especially intriguing because, unlike 
obnoxious or threatening harassment to which reasonable people by definition 
object, individual reactions to gender-specific appearance rules tend to vary 
depending on individual gender identity and custom. However, the purpose of 
Title VII is to end discrimination, even when it is customary. Thus, the tension 
between the law’s promise to end gender distinctions and judges’ reluctance to 
get too far ahead of social norms was obvious, and it underscored the strategic 
need to offer a limiting principle. 
At the same time, it seemed clear that, regardless of how the analysis might 
be done in harder cases, Harrah’s extraordinarily intrusive makeup policy was a 
good place to start. With its stringent requirements—including training by a 
 
 83. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977); Barker v. Taft Broadcasting 
Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham 
v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th 
Cir. 1974). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s . . . sex.” (alteration added)); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 
1982) (explaining that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) is violated when there is a “significantly greater 
burden” imposed by sex and such a burden alters the terms or conditions of employment), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983). 
 85. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]hat violates Title VII are those [appearance requirements] that rest upon a message 
of gender subordination. . . . When early challenges to requirements that men keep their hair short 
arose in the federal courts, those requirements stemmed not from gender subordination, but from 
fear of a youth counterculture.” (alteration added)). 
 86. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem 
(Ohio), 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 87. 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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consultant to apply just-so the mandatory four types of makeup daily without 
exception, and supervisors charged to adjudge each female employee against 
her photograph—the policy was heavy-handed and controlling to an extreme 
degree, even for the unrelentingly competitive world of Nevada casinos. 
C. The BFOQ Analysis That Should Have Been 
The number of cases addressing what can, and what cannot, constitute a 
bona fide occupational qualification is somewhat limited,88 but the rule they 
follow has been honored consistently: Customer preferences do not legitimate 
otherwise discriminatory company policies.89 This is not to say that Title VII 
should prevent a company from altering or enhancing its “brand image” with 
new themes or snazzier uniforms. Rather, the statute simply should limit an 
employer’s ability to impose policies that burden employees selectively along 
lines forbidden by the civil rights law. Thus, no casino should be free to “freshen 
its brand” by dictating that its female employees undergo a stylized, ultra-
feminine “makeover,” while males remain free to determine their own facial 
appearance as they please, advised merely to be clean and neat. If a company 
chooses to impose a one-sided, sex-based change, it should be prepared to prove 
why doing so is essential to its business.90 
Just as in Frank, Gerdom, and Carroll, courts considering a gender-specific 
rule should inquire into what the actual jobs at issue entail. Dress code analysis 
necessarily varies with the job in question. Thus, a court should both ascertain 
the nature of the job and then consider any legitimate reasons for marking the 
employees who do the job as male or female with sex-specific attire or grooming 
rules. For example, being female or male and dressing (or undressing) in 
particular ways certainly could be BFOQs for certain adult entertainment jobs. 
Anyone who accepts a job as an erotic dancer cannot be heard to object to the 
sexy costume and related job duties. Likewise, women who seek to work as a 
“Hooter’s girl” must be prepared to wear the tight-T-shirt uniform for which 
that restaurant chain is known.91 
In Jespersen’s case, Harrah’s purported to justify its makeup rule by 
comparing its casinos to Disneyland.92 But that comparison only underscores the 
distinction that must be made between actors and sales clerks. Not all Disney 
 
 88. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); Fernandez v. 
Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Brief of the National Employment Lawyers 
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating 
Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2003 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 30. 
 89. In this case, it is fair to say that the customers’ actual preferences were conveyed in 
Jespersen’s copious, effusive “guest comments” attesting that Harrah’s customers appreciated 
Jespersen as she was, without makeup. 
 90. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, 
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2565–68 (1994). 
 91. Id. at 2578. 
 92. Answering Brief for the Appellee-Defendant at 33, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 
F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2003 WL 22716702; see also Brief for the Council for 
Employment Law Equity et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee, Jespersen v. 
Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2003 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 
250. 
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employees are entertainers. Harrah’s references do not acknowledge the 
difference between cartoon-costumed performers portraying Goofy or Sleeping 
Beauty and those selling food and souvenirs. True, Disney’s sales clerks wear 
uniforms and must “act” perky, but no reasonable juror would confuse those 
clerks with the cartoon-costumed actors, let alone see the clerks as actors with 
sex-specific roles. 
Yes, Harrah’s is an entertainment venue. But, according to its bartenders’ 
job description—the contents of which were undisputed—the casino’s staff are 
not performers of any kind. They do not portray any role other than themselves. 
More importantly, there are no gender-based distinctions in the bartenders’ job 
duties that would explain why women could be considered performers who 
require makeup when men are not.93 The extreme, unjustifiable nature of 
Harrah’s policy was even more evident in the fact that the company required all 
female beverage service employees to wear the complete makeup regimen 
whether they were tending bar or working as “bar backs,” hauling crates of 
bottles, glasses, and ice. The notion that Harrah’s business success depends on 
its female employees wearing full makeup to lug supplies in the back room is 
just plain silly, and certainly speaks for itself without requiring expert testimony 
to disprove it. 
In the end, accepting a corporate claim that service personnel are 
performers without any substantiation—especially when job descriptions 
indicate to the contrary—is dangerous. It does real damage to the longstanding, 
important “no customer preference” rule—a rule that Congress recognized is 
essential for Title VII to act as a meaningful check on business owners’ ability to 
impose any rules that they believe will enhance their bottom line, no matter how 
discriminatory and demeaning for employees.94 
D. Some Apparent Concerns and Priorities of the Federal Bench 
Preparing for the oral argument before the three-judge panel, we expected 
hypothetical questions about other types of employee gender nonconformity. 
Given how strongly some people object to gender-variant men (a social 
phenomenon with which we are very familiar at Lambda Legal), we presumed 
there would be special interest in male employee gender nonconformity. 
Interestingly, questions posed during oral argument actually focused much 
more on limited divergence from conventional—if not downright old-
fashioned—grooming norms for women. For example, there were questions 
about female employees who might decline to shave their legs and wear 
stockings. I also was asked whether Title VII limits a law firm’s right to fire a 
female attorney who will not wear skirted suits.95 The extensive hypotheticals 
about gender nonconformity never came close to addressing the possibility of 
men in skirts, or women in ties, or other more notable gender-bending. Rather, it 
was evident that two members of the panel were troubled enough at the thought 
 
 93. Rehearing Petition Ex. 2, supra note 61, at 83–84. 
 94. See generally Brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al., supra note 88. 
 95. As someone who routinely wore pants suits to court while employed by a large private law 
firm, has not worn a skirted suit for a decade, and was wearing a pinstripe pants suit while 
responding to the question, I suspected my equivocal response may have seemed disingenuous. 
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of even moderately freer gender expression in the workplace. And it seemed not 
to assuage those worries that Title VII decisions have reiterated consistently for 
decades that the statute’s core inquiry is whether, “but for” an employee’s sex, 
he or she would have been treated differently.96 In Jespersen’s case, that inquiry 
is poignant indeed; no one questions that were Darlene male she still would be 
tending Harrah’s Sports Bar and receiving steady praise from her supervisors 
and guests alike. 
During the en banc argument, the focus was different, with questions 
probing whether, if our theory were accepted, future challenges to sex-specific 
appearance rules could not be disposed of easily on summary judgment and, 
instead, all such cases would require trials. One answer is that there is no claim, 
and thus no need for trial, except where an employee shows that a sex-specific 
rule demeans the employee’s professional stature, or curtails her opportunities 
to a cognizable degree. As noted above, the text of Title VII supports the 
threshold requirement that the appearance rule must have sufficient impact to 
change the terms or conditions of employment.97 Plaintiffs do not necessarily 
need experts to make that showing in harassment cases, and frivolous 
harassment cases often are rejected on summary judgment. At the same time, it 
is the quintessential role of jurors to decide whether a reasonable person in a 
plaintiff’s position would find particular treatment trivial or intolerable. Why 
should appearance rules require such a different analysis? Are there truly 
doctrinal reasons to assess these cases differently, as distinct from the 
recognized judicial concerns about docket management and the less sympathetic 
business concerns about litigation costs? 
The threshold requirement also means that appearance rules to which 
individual employees object, but which tend to enhance their professional look 
or stature—such as suits and ties rather than casual wear—are less subject to 
challenge.98 This approach provides for a careful check of rules that differentiate 
by sex, rather than of rules that simply require a standardized appearance at 
which an iconoclast may balk. This is in keeping with Title VII’s duty to reduce 
differential treatment based on sex, pursuant to the statute’s overarching 
purpose of eradicating discrimination. Thus, there should be a meaningful test of 
any rule that requires women to express their gender in a specified, feminine 
way, especially if it marks them as different from their male coworkers in a way 
that may be subordinating, and interferes with their ability to do their jobs and 
to blend in, as Darlene Jespersen wanted to do. 
Consequently, this critique of rigid, sex-based rules does not impugn 
employer rules against provocative dress, outlandish hairstyles, unusual body 
 
 96. See, e.g., City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). 
 97. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 98. This principle distinguishes the cases in which men objected unsuccessfully to rules 
requiring them to cut their hair short and wear ties. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 
F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). We argued that the competent professional 
role for men often is not comparable to the gender stereotypes for women, including professional 
women. The expectation is not to be notably sexual, and yet the conventions for women—baring 
one’s legs, wearing heels that make one less stable on one’s feet than flat shoes, and decorating 
oneself with makeup—connote a role that is more decorative, more objectified, and less dignified. 
See Bartlett, supra note 90, at 2547. 
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piercings, visible tattoos, distracting jewelry, or other self-presentation that 
causes an individual to stand out. It may be that our laws should protect 
employees’ liberty to a greater extent in this regard. Title VII does so to a certain 
extent when there are religious or cultural reasons for an individual’s non-
conforming appearance. But Jespersen’s goal was the opposite. She wanted to 
blend in with her coworkers, rather than be marked as different. Her wish was 
consistent with Harrah’s rule against “garish” nail polish and “faddish” 
hairstyles.99 And to be clear, contrary to Harrah’s characterization of Jespersen’s 
position,100 Darlene never sought a ban on makeup. She never sought to impose 
a unisex rule, nor did she object to the Harrah’s uniform.101 Indeed, she wore it 
proudly for twenty years. As a dignified, hard-working bartender, she simply 
sought the same basic respect as was accorded to her male coworkers, because 
there is nothing wrong with her face, notwithstanding her gender. If the male 
bartenders were deemed “professional” when neat, clean, and uniformed, then 
she should have been as well. Title VII should promise this much to America’s 
working women. Therefore, just as Ann Hopkins was entitled to argue to a jury 
that Price Waterhouse’s partners had no valid reasons for suggesting that she 
alter her appearance to look more conventionally feminine, and as the female 
bank clerks of the Talman Federal Savings and Loan had substantiated their 
discrimination claim amply by submitting the bank’s own policy (with its 
unmistakably subordinating message communicated by its plain language), 
Jespersen should have had her day in court. Given the undisputed terms of the 
casino’s policy, Harrah’s at least should have been required to substantiate its 
claimed business need to insist that only its female bartenders wear company-
dictated uniforms on their faces, along with the tuxedo-style uniforms all the 
bartenders wore—male and female alike.102 
IV. THE EN BANC DECISION: A BREAKTHROUGH AND MANY NEW QUESTIONS 
The majority opinion authored by Chief Judge Schroeder affirmed the 
grant of summary judgment against Darlene Jespersen, concluding that 
Jespersen had not submitted enough evidence to show that there was a triable 
issue regarding the burdens allegedly imposed on women by Harrah’s makeup 
requirement.103 Judge Schroeder first determined that Harrah’s entire appearance 
 
 99. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 100. Answering Brief for the Appellee-Defendant, supra note 92, at 36. 
 101. Reply Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff at 8–10, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 
(9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2003 WL 22716706. 
 102. Indeed, with reference to the gender stereotypes that infuse America’s playrooms, this 
particular sex-specific appearance rule seems particularly incongruous in that it required Darlene to 
emulate Barbie’s face though her uniform came from Ken’s wardrobe. For educational reasons, we 
decided to post Darlene’s “Personal Best” photographs on the web, together with a recent 
photograph, in part to allow those following the case to see this incongruity, and also to see that 
there is nothing odd or unusual about Darlene’s appearance. She is a friendly-looking person whose 
face looks pleasant and welcoming in its natural state. 
 103. Although the ultimate conclusion of the majority opinion was the same as the three-judge 
panel and the district court before it, the decision employs different reasoning and suggests that it 
might have reached another result had evidence been submitted: (1) to show the costs of purchasing 
makeup and the time required to apply it; (2) to confirm Harrah’s management’s discriminatory 
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policy must be considered as a whole.104 This approach seems inconsistent, 
however, with the approach she took when authoring the Ninth Circuit’s 1982 
en banc decision in Gerdom, in which the court found that Continental Airlines’ 
weight policy violated Title VII without considering all the other elements of the 
airlines’ appearance rules. But considering the appearance requirements as a 
whole may highlight sensibly the greater discrimination inherent in Harrah’s 
requirement that female cocktail servers wear not only full makeup (like the 
bartenders), but also skirts and high heels, while balancing their trays among 
tipsy, randy casino guests. It is notable, however, that the decision strangely 
fails to inquire into the cocktail servers’ job description when making the 
comparison between the two jobs. 
Although the decision’s analysis is somewhat cursory, it is remarkable in at 
least two positive respects. First, the comment that there may be more actionable 
discrimination in the appearance rules applicable to the female-dominated 
cocktail server job—for which female employees must wear much more 
restrictive, stereotypical attire—indicates that the catch-22 element discussed in 
Price Waterhouse105 is not essential. According to this decision, the more 
restrictive, uncomfortable, or otherwise problematic the sex-specific 
requirement, the more vulnerable it will be to challenge. This notion is 
consistent with Carroll, Gerdom, and Frank, in which the plaintiffs were 
performing “women’s jobs.” It is consistent in particular with Carroll, which 
predated Price Waterhouse by ten years, and did not address—let alone require—
a showing that the female bank employees faced any catch-22. Judge 
Schroeder’s confirmation that plaintiffs need not demonstrate a catch-22 element 
underscores that the most entrenched, oppressive rules may be the most 
vulnerable to challenge, as they should be. 
Second, in an explicit and important step forward, the majority holds “that 
appearance standards, including makeup requirements, may well be the subject 
of a Title VII claim for sexual stereotyping . . . .”106 Prior case law had tested 
appearance codes only to ascertain whether they imposed unequal burdens on 
men and women, and had held that there is no sex discrimination in sex-
differentiated dress policies so long as female and male employees are 
constrained by stereotypes to an equal extent.107 These cases did not, however, 
 
intent to impose sex stereotypes; (3) to provide an objective measure of the physical and 
psychological burdens on female employees; (4) to illustrate how the required makeup tends to lead 
to sexual harassment; or (5) to demonstrate more fully how the makeup interferes with female 
bartenders’ ability to do the job. 
 104. Thus, in this case, one must compare the “Personal Best” requirements of full makeup and 
teased/styled/curled hair for women against the washed face and clipped hair for men, and also 
consider the bartenders’ uniform, which is largely, using Judge Schroeder’s word, “unisex.” 
 105. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 106. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 107. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2000) (striking down differential 
weight rule), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 914 (2001); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 
1982) (en banc) (same); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding hair 
length restriction for male employees held to be equally burdensome as applicable rule for female 
employees); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977) (same); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 
527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975) (same); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 
1975) (same); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974) (same); Sprogis v. United Air 
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involve policies that imposed very different requirements on women and men. 
Differential weight rules can be balanced. So, too, can a requirement that female 
flight attendants wear contact lenses, when male attendants have the choice to 
wear glasses. Again, as noted above, there is something odd and incoherent 
about the “apples-to-oranges” comparison Judge Schroeder’s analysis seems to 
endorse. It also seems inconsistent with the decisions rejecting the “equal 
opportunity” harasser defense.108 
Despite the unpersuasiveness of this approach, Judge Schroeder’s opinion 
takes an important step by recognizing that dress and grooming stereotypes can 
be burdensome. Hence, forcing compliance with them can violate Title VII if the 
burden is heavy enough. Under this clarified analysis, an employer should no 
longer be able to avoid Title VII liability simply by “balancing” the burden on 
one gender with an “equally” restrictive stereotype for employees of a different 
gender. 
In addition to confirming that the sex stereotyping doctrine is not restricted 
to harassment cases, the opinion also offers multiple suggestions for how future 
cases may show that impermissible sexual stereotyping has occurred. Thus, in 
future cases, plaintiffs may be well advised to develop evidence detailing 
burdens of cost, time, and physical restriction. It also may be helpful to try to 
provide an “objective” assessment of an appearance rule’s burdens on female 
(or male) employees generally in order to confirm the reasonableness of a 
particular plaintiff’s testimony about the subjective impact upon her. 
The suggestion that a plaintiff should show that her objection is reasonable 
may seem to draw unremarkably from the common discrimination question 
about what is reasonable in the context. Yet, how should this objective 
confirmation be obtained as to stereotypes that many people take for granted 
and do not contemplate resisting? Unlike harassment, which is generally 
unpleasant for anyone subjected to it, some people like wearing makeup and 
very gender-specific clothing. Others find such appearance expectations 
extremely oppressive. Often, one’s reaction will be determined by one’s gender 
identity and usual gender expression. A very feminine cocktail server may 
delight in daily access to a makeup trainer, while an androgynous person like 
Darlene Jespersen may despise the idea. How should courts select the 
“reasonable person” for a particular comparison? If one sex or another 
historically has dominated a job, should that influence the selection of the 
gender identity of the “reasonable person” used as a comparator? It would have 
been consistent with Price Waterhouse had the Jespersen court used a “reasonable 
person” with a masculine or androgynous gender identity to test the 
reasonableness of Harrah’s rules for bartenders, and it probably would have 
vindicated Darlene’s discrimination claim. But that approach would undermine 
Title VII’s effectiveness in challenges to sex-based rules that are common in a 
field, but burdensome and unjustifiable, as in the cases against the airlines. 
 
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 
366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973) (finding discriminatory the airline’s policy requiring female flight 
attendants to wear contact lenses while permitting male attendants to wear glasses). 
 108. See discussion supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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In addition, why is it preferable to rely on an “expert” voice rather than just 
having the jury do the assessment as in harassment cases? Is it likely that experts 
actually will be required in most future cases? Such an understanding would be 
inconsistent with prior case law. Ann Hopkins was not required to submit 
evidence that other Price Waterhouse female account managers objected to 
wearing makeup, jewelry, and pastel suits. She did not need an expert to give an 
“objective” assessment as to what was deemed acceptable for women, as 
opposed to men, in similar business contexts. The comparator in Price 
Waterhouse was what the men doing Ann Hopkins’ same job were doing, not 
what businesswomen elsewhere were doing. 
Some of the majority’s suggestions seem odd indeed. For example, as Judge 
Kozinski points out in his dissent, it seems manifestly incorrect that expert 
testimony would be required to confirm what members of any jury are perfectly 
capable of perceiving on their own. Most people called to serve on a jury will 
have either applied makeup personally or watched others do so—at least 
enough to know that it takes time to do it properly. Judge Kozinski also pointed 
out that, although some women are sufficiently accustomed to wearing makeup 
to consider it inoffensive and nonremarkable, his exposure leads him to 
conclude that reasonable jurors easily could agree with Jespersen (and him) that 
those not accustomed to makeup could find a makeup mandate demeaning to 
an extent that would impair one’s ability to work. 
It is curious also that the majority faulted Darlene’s case for not presenting 
more evidence “that the challenged policy was part of a policy motivated by sex 
stereotyping.”109 While it might have been helpful to have more evidence of 
what Harrah’s executives had in mind when they decided to require makeup for 
women (like the evidence Ann Hopkins had from the reviews of her work 
performance by her former Price Waterhouse colleagues), the details of Harrah’s 
sex-based rule are plain in the text of the policy and Harrah’s stated its intention 
both in its policy and through its expert. Per the “Personal Best” policy, servers 
must be “body toned and appealing to the eye.”110 The company has expressed 
openly its view that its female beverage servers cannot look professional and 
“appealing” unless they alter their faces to achieve the company-approved, 
multi-element “look.” There is no secret motive to ferret out and introduce into 
evidence. 
Therefore, what purpose would it serve to obtain more evidence of the 
employer’s intent when the appearance code already explicitly requires 
conformity with stereotypes? In other words, the intent to treat employees 
differently “because of sex” is stated directly. That by itself is contrary to the 
statute and requires justification. In contrast, direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent is relevant in mixed-motive cases and when the facial distinction is 
permissible but the plaintiff believes the distinction was used as pretext to 
accomplish an impermissible, discriminatory end. As with race, religion, and 
other characteristics enumerated in Title VII, different treatment based on sex 
 
 109. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1106. 
 110. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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must be justified with a legitimate reason, and it is no answer that the employer 
lacked any intent to cause harm or distress.111 
Again, in Price Waterhouse, the evidence of discriminatory intent was 
relevant because it was a mixed-motive case in which the plaintiff’s job 
performance had been impugned. On the disputed question of whether Ann 
Hopkins had been denied partnership based on her job performance or her 
gender performance, evidence of the partners’ intent was critical. But in 
Jespersen, there was no question what the company was trying to accomplish 
and why it fired Darlene. As noted above, her performance had been exemplary. 
The casino simply was making assumptions about the preferences of its 
customers.112 
So was the en banc majority confused? Or were those judges just unwilling 
to give Jespersen and others with similar complaints the right to a jury trial, 
unless they can show that a challenged rule presents a bigger problem. In future 
cases, perhaps plaintiffs will try to show broad, class-based resistance to the rule 
in question (as in the airline cases), or present some kind of objective basis for 
concluding that a “reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position” would find the 
requirement unreasonable. 
It is helpful to have the en banc majority’s exploration of the types of 
evidence that may be used in future cases to show actionable different treatment 
through a dress code that imposes sex stereotypes. Of course, Darlene’s trial 
counsel would have benefited from having this guidance when he was opposing 
the summary judgment motion in the district court. But, as it had not been 
established that the sex stereotyping doctrine could be applied against an 
oppressive dress code, it was even less clear what evidence would be deemed 
important to prove the claim.113 
 
 111. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982). 
 112. The case law has been explicit that customer preference, without more, is not an excuse for 
otherwise discriminatory treatment of employees. See supra notes 48, 88, 90 and accompanying text. 
So to the extent that catering to customers was Harrah’s goal, that purpose should not insulate the 
sex-based treatment of bartenders from review under Title VII. The court seems simply to have 
assumed that the makeup requirement is a BFOQ, and then to have reasoned backwards to inquire 
whether that presumptively legitimate business reason should be deemed illegitimate due to an 
impermissible discriminatory motive. 
 113. At the same time, neither of Darlene Jespersen’s trial lawyers can be accused of over-
preparation. Like many plaintiff-side employment lawyers who work on a contingency, Jespersen’s 
initial counsel filed the case and then conducted minimal discovery. He negotiated a settlement for 
Jespersen that he apparently believed she should have embraced, and lost interest when she did not. 
Jespersen was unsatisfied with the settlement proposal because it would not have made her whole 
financially, and in exempting her—but only her—from the makeup rule, Harrah’s would have 
singled her out in a problematic way. Consequently, she found herself heading into her deposition 
without counsel, and with the period for affirmative discovery drawing to a close. Her second trial 
counsel entered the case in time to defend her deposition and oppose the summary judgment 
motion. Jespersen had gathered information about the cost of makeup necessary to comply with the 
“Personal Best” policy. However, for reasons that are unclear, this material was not submitted with 
the summary judgment opposition. As for the other types of evidence that Chief Judge Schroeder 
opined might substantiate a Title VII claim against an oppressively sexist appearance rule, even if 
trial counsel had had the benefit of that hindsight advice, there was limited time to develop any such 
evidence before the close of discovery. 
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With that said, the far clearer analysis comes in the two dissents that 
concluded Jespersen offered ample evidence to shift the burden to Harrah’s to 
show the business necessity for insisting that women wear all that makeup. First 
is the straightforward dissenting opinion of Judge Pregerson (joined by Judges 
Kozinski, Graber, and Fletcher) agreeing us that the terms of the policy itself, as 
well as Jespersen’s testimony, were ample to show that the policy imposed a sex 
stereotype of a sort that can violate Title VII. 
Then comes the pointed and humorous dissent by Judge Kozinski (joined 
by Judges Graber and Fletcher), who agreed with us that summary judgment 
was improper on both the sex stereotyping theory and the unequal burden 
argument. In addition to joining Judge Pregerson’s opinion, he wrote separately 
that it does not require an expert to know that it costs more money and time to 
use makeup than to not use makeup, and that each of Harrah’s grooming 
requirements manifestly was equally or more burdensome for women, 
amounting to an unmistakably more burdensome policy overall, or at least one 
that reasonable jurors could find to be so. 
Given the majority’s evidentiary roadmap for future cases, and the 
dissents’ explanations of why the record showed clearly a sex-based burden that 
requires company justification, the opinions taken together have moved the law 
forward in ways that may make future challenges to stereotypical dress and 
grooming rules easier to win. This is especially important for the millions of 
women in service-sector jobs where sex-specific uniforms are common; women 
routinely are required to wear heels and skirts and otherwise to present 
themselves in ways that can make it physically harder to do their jobs. Such 
uniforms also mark women as members of the female class of workers—
separate from the male class—with all the restrictive, subordinating effects that 
may bring. It will be for lawyers preparing future cases to develop ways to 
document those negative effects. 
Note that the Oncale decision similarly gave examples of how to prove in 
subsequent cases that same-sex sexual harassment was “because of sex,” rather 
than because of sexual orientation (or something else not covered by Title VII). It 
has been important in some cases since Oncale to emphasize that the Supreme 
Court in Oncale did not purport to be exhaustive of the ways one might prove a 
violation.114 Here too, the majority’s various suggestions should be understood 
as options for future cases, not as mandatory elements of a new, multi-part test. 
 
Lambda Legal, through a former staff attorney, actually was prepared to represent Jespersen at the 
outset of the case, but, for reasons that are not clear, Darlene was discouraged from accepting public 
interest representation. This author came to know her a couple of years later, toward the end of the 
district court proceedings. As Jespersen’s experience illustrates, it was hard enough already for 
someone like her to find counsel to challenge this type of discrimination, especially when it involves 
a novel question of law and there is limited likelihood of recovering sizable damages. Although it 
advances the law in important respects, the en banc decision’s procedural “suggestions” may well 
make the situation worse in some respects, to the detriment of working people. 
 114. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(relying on Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), and approving same-sex sexual 
harassment claim); 305 F.3d at 1068–69 (Pregerson, J., concurring) (relying on Oncale, 523 U.S. 75, and 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), and approving gender 
stereotyping claim); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing 
Oncale, 523 U.S. 75, and permitting “based on sex” element of same-sex sexual harassment claim to 
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V. MOVING FORWARD: TWO GUIDING THEMES 
As we anticipate the work to come in this still important area, two themes 
deserve special emphasis. First, we should anticipate that corporate marketing 
planners and image-makers will continue to attempt to standardize the 
appearance of their companies’ workers in sex-specific ways, along lines 
believed to appeal to customers. Although some contexts may present hard 
questions of when such policies really are legitimate, in many more, the 
marketers’ concepts will deserve resistance because they will incorporate 
gratuitously restrictive or burdensome gender stereotypes that are seen as 
having appeal. The Jespersen decision offers a road map to those advocates who 
wish to tackle other, sex-based assumptions about the proper roles—and rules—
for workers in particular fields. To be sure, the case law is not a model of clarity. 
But, it invites further development and does offer tools. Equally important to 
such future efforts, however, will be a federal bench comprised of independent 
jurists who approach such cases with open minds, and with as much concern for 
workers as for employers and for judicial efficiency. Twenty-five years of 
conservative activism—which have included aggressive focus on judicial 
selection and relentless attacks on courts that enforce civil rights laws—have 
altered both the personnel of the federal judiciary and many judges’ sense of the 
role they have been appointed to serve. It is long past time for voices to be 
amplified in defense of strict civil rights enforcement by judges who reflect and 
aim to serve the full diversity of our society. This section addresses these two 
themes in turn. 
A. “Branding” and achieving a “professional look” should not be equated with 
narrow stereotypes unless they are BFOQs. 
The Jespersen en banc majority confused three distinct categories of 
appearance rules: (1) legitimate rules forbidding idiosyncratic behavior or 
appearance that would detract from the company brand or otherwise causes 
business problems, which are neutral as to sex, race, color, national origin and 
religion; (2) illegitimate rules that impose restrictions based on sex or another 
characteristic covered by Title VII, without business necessity; and (3) rules that 
vary based on sex or another characteristic covered by Title VII, which are 
legitimate because they are BFOQs. In a great many instances, valid and invalid 
rules can be distinguished easily if considered in context. Thus, employers 
 
be proven through evidence that employee was harassed based on a perception that he had 
“feminine mannerisms” and a belief that he “did not act as a man should act”); Schmedding v. 
Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865, n.4 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument that same-sex sexual 
harassment cases fail if they do not allege facts falling within one of the three scenarios mentioned in 
Oncale, 523 U.S. 75, explaining: “We think this reading of Oncale is misguided. While Oncale does 
recite these three methods of proving sexual harassment, it refers to them as examples of 
‘evidentiary routes’ a plaintiff might ‘choose[] to follow’ in establishing his case.”); Shepherd v. 
Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Pac. Rail Servs., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1549, *4–*7 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (following Shepherd, 168 F.3d 998, in concluding that the examples in 
Oncale, 523 U.S. 75, were “not exhaustive,” and allowing plaintiff to proceed on theory of “same-sex 
harassment based on his perceived non-conformance to gender-based stereotypes”); Spearman v. 
Ford Motor Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14852, at *15–*19 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d, 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 995 (2001). 
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should not worry about insisting upon the modesty, neatness, and cleanliness of 
their employees; no sensible person would argue against a rule that employees 
should be clean, neat, and covered sufficiently to avoid being an annoyance or 
distraction to their coworkers.115 As another illustration, consider a restaurant in 
West Hollywood, California—a city known for its large, image-conscious gay 
community. The establishment would not run afoul of Title VII if it prohibits its 
wait staff from wearing facial jewelry and gaudy hair colors. But if it requires its 
male waiters to use an artificial suntan lotion or to wear very tight pants, while 
women doing the same job may wear loose trousers or forego the fake tan, then 
the men are on display and the women are not, though both are doing the same 
job. 
It may be more obvious that an artificial tan is not a BFOQ if one considers 
bank tellers rather than waiters. At any rate, gender differentiation is suspect 
under Title VII in all cases and requires company justification. Yet, again, a shift 
in burden to the employer does not always mean a trial will be required. Note 
that the question on summary judgment is whether a reasonable jury could find 
in the nonmoving party’s favor. If the employer were a Chippendales nightclub, 
for example, it should be obvious to even the most sheltered juror that tight 
pants will be de rigueur for male employees who perform for that audience, and 
may not be so for female employees. 
B. Enforcement of civil rights and other workers’ rights laws requires a fair and 
independent judiciary. 
While appreciating all that has been achieved through this inspiring 
symposium and other enlightening academic work, it also is useful to 
acknowledge how this case illustrates the real-world results of the federal 
judicial selection process of recent decades. From the questions Chief Judge 
Schroeder asked during the en banc oral argument in Jespersen, among other 
reasons, it seems highly unlikely that she has shifted radically in her judicial 
philosophy and has repudiated the straightforward analysis she articulated so 
clearly twenty years ago in Gerdom. Thus, when reading the Gerdom decision 
side-by-side with the one she just authored in Jespersen, the suspicion inevitably 
arises that she simply no longer had the votes to apply the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine analysis this time as she did before.116 
 
 115. Yet, there is a need for greater public education about what Title VII requires in this area. 
When consulting on these issues with organizations that serve Human Resources professionals who 
develop or enforce employee appearance codes, this author has been surprised to encounter 
widespread confusion between rules that disallow sexually provocative or otherwise inappropriate 
workplace attire, and rules aimed at the same problems that go much further and needlessly 
mandate sex-specific stereotypes. Some of this confusion is understandable given the still evolving, 
ambivalent, and sometimes-inconsistent state of the law. See Bartlett supra note 90, at 2579. 
 116. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
Where a claim of discriminatory treatment is based upon a policy which on its face applies 
less favorably to one gender, this court has held that the plaintiff need not otherwise estab-
lish the presence of discriminatory intent. . . . Because Continental’s facially discriminatory 
policy itself supplies the requisite elements of a prima facie case, we must look to Conti-
nental’s efforts to rebut it. A prima facie showing of discrimination is rebutted by raising a 
genuine issue of fact as to the existence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
challenged practice. 
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Accordingly, in addition to scholarly work analyzing the decisions being 
rendered by a dramatically more conservative federal bench, those desiring to 
make positive contributions to the law affecting workers and other vulnerable 
populations would do well also to participate in the discussions and processes 
that affect judicial selection. The questions posed during the Jespersen en banc 
appellate argument by a number of the more recently appointed judges seemed 
to reveal a common belief that companies usually should be able to dispense 
with dress code challenges on summary judgment. From that, it is hard not to 
conclude that some members of the bench are more aware of the “burdens” on 
employers than those on workers. Because life experience shapes judicial 
philosophy, it is critical that these appointed judges reflect the full diversity of 
our society and legal practice. 
The importance of more liberal scholars and opinion leaders joining the 
effort to educate the public about society’s need for a fair and independent 
judiciary, and about the shift in power within our society and government that 
has occurred through scores of reactionary judicial appointments, cannot be 
overstated.117 Many years of well-funded attacks on judicial independence have 
taken a toll. The rhetoric that the courts are arrogant, elitist, suspect, and anti-
democratic has taken root to a very troubling degree. Although most Americans 
still would agree that the courts have played an indispensable role as an 
independent branch—able and responsible to strike down terrible injustices 
such as racial segregation and other forms of group-based labeling and 
subordination now recognized to be egregious—reporters and pundits in 
mainstream media habitually use terms like “activist judges” without definition 
or acknowledgement of the political assumptions and goals embedded in that 
term. And both corporate and social conservative voices alike rail against any 
court decision with which they disagree, feeding popular misperceptions that 
our courts frequently overstep their role irresponsibly in radical, harmful ways. 
Notwithstanding the tremendous educational value of symposia, law review 
articles, and other scholarly work about legal theories for challenging injustice, if 
those who wish to see workers’ rights and civil rights laws enforced do not 
participate more vigorously in the educational and political processes 
concerning judicial selection and the proper role of the courts, these liberal ideas 
increasingly will be relevant only as history and Utopian social philosophy. 
VI. CONCLUSION: RESPECTING THE FACE VALUE OF WORKING WOMEN 
Darlene Jespersen remained courageous and determined throughout her 
struggle with Harrah’s. I do not know anyone else who would have been 
steadfast through the hardships she endured to press the case. Individuals like 
 
Id. (applying the tests developed in Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 
(1981), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); also citing Norris v. Arizona 
Governing Comm., 671 F.2d 330, 333 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 904 (1982), and Douglas v. 
Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 117. Lambda Legal has an education campaign underway called “Courting Justice,” which aims 
to educate and engage those who otherwise would not know how to make their voices heard on 
federal judicial nominations and related issues of judicial independence. For more information, see 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/courtingjustice/index.html?page=justice_index. 
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Darlene make it possible for impact litigation to take place for the benefit of 
entire classes of vulnerable people. It is gratifying to have clarified successfully 
that dress codes are not exempt from the law against sex discrimination by 
imposition of gender stereotypes and that reasonableness—the quintessential 
jury question—is a key part of the analysis. Darlene’s personal sacrifice already 
has made a difference. Yet, it is frustrating and just plain wrong—both legally 
and morally—that the en banc majority denied Darlene Jespersen the day in 
court she should have had under the very rule the en banc majority set forth. 
Harrah’s has taken every opportunity to proclaim that the company offered 
Darlene her job back, with an exemption from the makeup requirement. But, 
they never acknowledge how rudely inadequate that offer was for Darlene 
financially. Unlike Harrah’s, which is part of a massively wealthy corporate 
empire, Darlene suffered severe economic hardship from Harrah’s treatment of 
her. As the company knew, their financial offer would not have made Darlene 
whole. Having been on sound financial ground her entire working life, Darlene 
suddenly found herself unemployed and, seemingly, unemployable in Reno, 
which is something of a “company town.” Jespersen’s objection to Harrah’s 
makeup rule evidently made her persona non grata for the other casinos, clubs, 
and bars in town. After a prolonged period of unemployment, Darlene 
eventually came to support herself by working three part-time jobs, none of 
which provides benefits. 
Harrah’s management has never acknowledged how much other women 
despised the makeup rule, or why Jespersen feared being resented by her peers. 
No mention has ever been made of the essential esprit de corps that she would 
have lost if the company continued to enforce the “Personal Best” policy against 
her peers, while giving her special treatment in settlement of her lawsuit. 
Moreover, and contrary to Harrah’s many public statements about the 
casino’s purportedly friendly relations with the unions who represent its 
employees in Las Vegas, that situation does not exist at its Reno facility, where 
efforts to unionize repeatedly have been derailed and defeated. It is telling that 
no unions representing Harrah’s employees would join an amicus curiae brief 
on Jespersen’s behalf. From the outside, it is difficult to know whether this was 
because the unions have been concerned less about the grooming rules imposed 
on female workers and more about wages and other terms that apply to all 
union members, or because workers in the non-unionized Reno facility do not 
receive active support, or due to something else; in any event, the fact that 
Harrah’s employees in Reno lack union representation does reveal that it is a 
stretch on Harrah’s part to suggest that there was union acquiescence in the 
casino’s treatment of Jespersen. 
Harrah’s has won this battle. And yet the result hardly can be considered a 
vindication of this sex-discriminatory policy, or of the casino’s authority to 
promulgate more such policies. Instead, companies nationwide are now on 
notice that dress codes incorporating gender stereotypes can be challenged. Just 
as Oncale opened the door for Nichols and Rene, and Smith and Schoer have 
confirmed that Ulane and Holloway have been consigned to history, the stage has 
been set for the coming cases that will continue to champion the dignity and 
worth of working people generally, and the need to respect gender diversity in 
particular. 
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This issue remains important because women workers continue to be taken 
less seriously; they are disproportionately represented in lower-wage jobs, 
usually with less job security and often without benefits.118 As Judge Thomas 
emphasized in his dissent from the panel majority, it would have been a travesty 
had Price Waterhouse been construed as applying only to white-collar job 
settings, leaving unprotected those in blue-, pink-, and no-collar jobs where 
uniforms, standardization, and limited individual bargaining power are the 
norms. Thus, it is a triumph that the en banc majority opened the door for future 
cases challenging appearance rules that enforce burdensome gender stereotypes. 
But, the majority also may have imposed strange new hurdles that will make 
such cases more complicated, more expensive, and thus more difficult for 
employees to pursue. Accordingly, we all must do our best to reduce this 
possibility. 
In America today, women need to be able to work, to receive a fair wage, 
and to retain a measure of personal dignity, just as men do. Toward this end, 
Title VII must continue to be a vital tool, as it has been, in fits and starts, since its 
enactment. Each succeeding generation experiences greater employment 
opportunities only when we nurture a shared vision of workplace equality. 
Absent a proven business necessity, each worker should be judged based on her 
job performance, not her gender performance. From the step forward 
accomplished in this case, the next steps must be taken to insist that this will be 
true. 
 
 118. See generally EVELYN MURPHY & E.J. GRAFF, GETTING EVEN: WHY WOMEN DON’T GET PAID 
LIKE MEN—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2006); BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON 
(NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001). 
